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in recent social and political theory. These are deployed 
to attack, on the one hand, empirical political science 
and, on the other hand, normative theory with univer- 
salist aspirations, such as that found in the work of 
Rawls. Zolo argues that the complexity of modern soci- 
eties and the resulting fragmentation of standards of 
truth doom both of these enterprises. Instead, we 
should begin with a view of politics as achieving "the 
selective regulation of social risks." We accede to polit- 
ical authority because this serves to reduce the uncer- 
tainties of social life, which, in the contemporary world, 
always tend to increase. 
This leads to a view of democracy that we might call 
neo-Schumpeterian. Zolo whole-heartedly endorses 
Schumpeter's famous attack on "the classical doctrine of 
democracy" but then goes on to argue that Schumpet- 
er's own elite-competition model has been overtaken by 
recent developments. Parties no longer genuinely com- 
pete to attract the popular vote: instead, they collude 
with each other and establish client relationships with 
groups outside the political sphere. The electorate no 
longer possess even that minimum level of political 
rationality needed to make the competitive model work. 
Their political experience is constructed for them by the 
mass media, which is most effective when not engaged 
in overt propaganda. The resulting system, Zolo argues, 
no longer deserves to be called a representative democ- 
racy: "liberal oligarchy" would be more accurate. 
Having delivered this indictment, Zolo's book comes 
to a sudden halt. He is hardly enchanted by the system 
he has described, but he appears to lack the resources to 
propose an alternative. Yet this disability is self-inflicted. 
He has ruled out, on epistemological grounds, empirical 
evidence that might, for instance, challenge his account 
of the effects of the mass media. And his attack on 
normative theory overlooks the fact that the systems he 
is describing are held together, in part at least, by the 
democratic principles espoused by their members, poli- 
ticians, and voters alike. (One of the less helpful of 
Zolo's borrowings is a form of functionalism that seeks 
to explain the workings of the political system without 
reference to the aims and intentions of the actors them- 
selves.) That is why Rawls's ambition to defend a 
normative theory by reference to the shared public 
culture of liberal democracies is not absurd. 
One might say that Zolo, having written his Prince, 
ought now to attempt his Discourses. Yet this is a 
challenging book for those inclined toward the radical 
democratic view taken up by most of the contributors to 
Mouffe's collection. Zolo lays his finger on the central 
difficulty: "What this radical-democratic vision appears 
to me to lack most of all is a perception of the variety, 
particularism and mutual incompatibility of social expec- 
tations in non-elementary societies. It fails to consider 
the structurally scarce nature both of social resources 
and of the instruments of power responsible for the 
allocation of politically distributable resources" (p. 70). 
In other words, some, at least, of the conflicts thrown up 
by a fragmented society are zero-sum; and simply to 
encourage higher levels of political participation by 
hitherto excluded or passive groups does nothing to 
resolve this problem. 
The challenge for would-be radical democrats is to 
show how it is possible both to respect the separate 
identities of the many groups that emerge in such a 
society and, at the same time, to arrive at collective 
decisions that are recognized as legitimate by all these 
groups. How can we be authentically female, black, gay, 
French-speaking, and so on but also equal citizens 
identifying with the laws and policies of the state? The 
challenge is a formidable one; and it is tempting to 
escape it by taking refuge in diffuse and obscure formu- 
lations in which Mouffe's book, unfortunately, abounds. 
Here, for instance, is the editor herself: 
The creation of political identities as radical democratic 
citizens depends therefore on a collective form of identifica- 
tion among the democratic demands found in a variety of 
movements: women, workers, black, gay, ecological, as well 
as in several other "new social movements." This is a 
conception of citizenship which, through a common identi- 
fication with a radical democratic interpretation of the prin- 
ciples of liberty and equality, aims at constructing a "we," a 
chain of equivalence among their demands so as to articulate 
them through the principle of democratic equivalence. (p. 236) 
If this means anything at all, it suggests some sponta- 
neous tempering of conflicting group demands in the 
name of democracy. But why and how? 
Not all the contributors to Mouffe's book are so 
evasive. Candid recognition of the conflict between 
personal identity and citizenship can be found in the 
chapter by Jean Leca, who draws attention to the break- 
down of a common culture (in France, especially) and 
the increasing difficulty of establishing cultural commu- 
nication between different groups (ethnic, regional, 
etc.), and in an elegant essay by Michael Walzer, who 
praises the rise of civil society as a sphere of free 
association but sees that it cannot fully substitute for 
democratic citizenship on the national scale. A robust 
form of republicanism is defended by Sheldon Wolin in 
the concluding chapter, and Mary Dietz endeavors to 
make this stance more appealing to feminists (though 
the constructive part of the argument remains somewhat 
undeveloped). Another robust republican, Hannah 
Arendt, is discussed in a helpful chapter by Maurizio 
Passerin d'Entreves: d'Entreves perhaps underestimates 
the distance that separates Arendt from the contempo- 
rary politics of identity. 
One theme that is missing from Mouffe's book is the 
idea of deliberative democracy, defended recently by 
Joshua Cohen, James Fishkin, and several others. If we 
are to acknowledge social complexity without falling 
prey to the pessimistic conclusions of Zolo's realism, it is 
to the possibilities of democratic dialogue between com- 
peting groups that we must surely look. 
Nuffield College, Oxford DAVID MILLER 
Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics. 
By Mary P. Nichols. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1991. 233p. $50.00 cloth, $19.95 paper. 
The Public and the Private in Aristotle's Political Phi- 
losophy. By Judith A. Swanson. Ithaca: Cornell Uni- 
versity Press, 1992. 244p. $32.95. 
These two studies-both eminently worth reading- 
have several points in common. Both Mary Nichols and 
Judith Swanson are sympathetic readers of Aristotle 
who seek to make sense of his texts without denying 
their difficulty and ambiguity. Both acknowledge the 
strangeness of those texts as seen from any modern 
point of view, but both presuppose-and then go on to 
show-that these texts are nevertheless pertinent for our 
own thinking about politics. Both avoid the sort of 
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anachronistic, simplifying, and inevitably condescend- 
ing reconstruction of Aristotle as a systematic philoso- 
pher that characterizes both Anglo-American analytic 
philosophical studies and the critical dismissals of Aris- 
totle from historicist and poststructuralist perspectives. 
Biographically, both authors express gratitude to Joseph 
Cropsey in their prefaces. Thematically, both are con- 
cerned with the problem of how to understand what 
Aristotle means by including, as an integral part of his 
political theorizing (both in Ethics 10 and Politics 7), the 
apparently antipolitical proposition that the political life 
cannot be ranked as highly as the philosophical or 
contemplative life; and both respond to this question in 
novel and interesting ways. 
But the answers the two books give to this interpretive 
puzzle are diametrically opposed to one other. For 
Swanson, Aristotle's explicit preference for philosophy 
is meant to call attention to the dangers of the political 
life and the attractiveness of lives lived outside the 
public realm; whereas Nichols, places Aristotle's occa- 
sionally explicit preference for philosophy in the context 
of the Politics as a whole to show that this preference is 
not antipolitical but carries with it the message that 
philosophy is only possible for those who live a certain 
kind of political life. The interpretive controversy is a 
legitimate and necessary one, since Aristotle's brief 
discussion in Ethics 10 and scattered remarks in Politics 7 
give no unequivocal answer to the question of how this 
infrequent privileging of philosophy over politics can be 
made to comport with his extensive defense of the 
political life, properly understood. Nichols and Swan- 
son, in effect, give two quite different responses to the 
interpretive problem of what to do with Aristotle's 
ranking of philosophy over politics. Their interpreta- 
tions open the way (as such interpretations should) to 
serious reflection on the politics of our own time. For 
Swanson, Aristotle's elevation of philosophy yields a 
defense of modern liberalism that can avoid the weak- 
nesses of present-day rights-based or utilitarian political 
theories; for Nichols, reading Aristotle on this question 
can lead us to a more complex and less utopian under- 
standing of politics than any modern political theory 
can, an understanding that-surprisingly-provides a 
powerful clarification and justification of modern de- 
mocracy. 
Stylistically, these are also two very different kinds of 
book. Nichols presents her novel and often controversial 
interpretations (e.g., that "polity" is the simply best 
regime, that the regime "according to prayer" is called 
the best only in irony, and that the best human life is 
impossible without political activity) in the form of a 
topic-by-topic and book-by-book commentary on the 
Politics. But her commentary is never so detailed that it 
fails to keep the whole text in view, thus opening her 
reading to question and revision by other readers of the 
Politics. All of us who teach the Politics, no matter how 
many or how few times we have done it before, will 
teach the book better and with more pleasure having 
read Nichols. The book should be of value both for 
experienced Aristotelians who need to see the text with 
a freshly invigorated eye and for beginning, nonspecial- 
ist teachers who are looking for interesting ways to 
problematize the Politics for their students. 
Swanson's argument for her equally controversial 
thesis, on the other hand, ranges over Aristotle's corpus 
as a whole, connecting Aristotelian ideas and lines of 
argument that are generally not connected, rather than 
commenting intensively on a single text. Her claim is 
that-contrary to modern communitarian interpreters of 
varying political stripes-Aristotle's political philosophy 
establishes the supreme human value of a set of activi- 
ties-including, but not limited to, philosophizing, the 
family, friendships, and the economy-that can flourish 
only within the private realm, activities that are inevita- 
bly threatened by the public. Her application of the 
private/public distinction to the text is less problematic 
than it may, at first glance, appear to be. While Aristotle 
does not speak of a distinction between private and 
public as such and thus does not himself explicitly assert 
anything about the value of either "the private" or "the 
public," Swanson's use of these terms as a way to open 
a dialogue with Aristotle is by no means an anachronis- 
tic imposition of modern concepts on a Greek text. One 
clear instance of a conception of "the private" in Greek 
philosophy is in Plato's Laws 739c-d, where the Athe- 
nian Stranger distinguishes between "what is called the 
private" and that which is said to be common, arguing 
that in the best regime everything would be common, 
including that which is by nature private, such as the 
eyes and the ears and the hands. There can be little 
doubt that Aristotle would both understand and reject 
the Stranger's claim; the modern formulation of the 
private/public issue would thus not be hopelessly unin- 
telligible to the voice we can imagine speaking to us in 
the texts of Aristotle. 
In essence, Swanson says that modern liberalism can 
borrow from Aristotle a defense of the private realm that 
is stronger than the familiar Lockean argument for the 
separation of private and public realms. There is a 
serious practical difficulty about this, however, in that 
Swanson's Aristotle would defend the private out of a 
deep mistrust of democratic public opinion, which he 
takes to be the principal obstacle to the development of 
human virtue. Thus, to accept Swanson's Aristotle on 
privacy, modern liberals would have to be convinced of 
the wisdom of abandoning their commitment to liberal 
democracy. 
Be that as it may, Swanson's Aristotle is concerned 
with establishing a robust private world that might 
shield good and potentially good human beings against 
the corrupting influence of public opinion (pp. 207-08). 
There is, for her Aristotle, a reciprocity between private 
and public that is really a kind of rapprochement be- 
tween the few and the many: the private sphere edu- 
cates good rulers for the city, while the city, in exchange, 
protects the privacy and the private achievements of the 
more virtuous few. A central interpretive difficulty is 
how to make Swanson's picture square with two Aris- 
totelian claims: (1) that a human life lived outside the 
laws is more likely to be beastly than angelic and (2) that 
for these laws to educate in virtue effectively, there must 
be not only widespread public consent but a significant 
degree of political participation, as well. When they are 
not actively appropriated by a majority of the citizens, 
the laws must fail to perform their primary function of 
supplying a moralizing authority that defines the city 
without reducing it to a unity. Swanson's response here 
is that the maintenance and revision of the laws and 
customs of any given polity are not of great concern 
because there is, for Aristotle, both a readily knowable 
natural hierarchy among human beings and a readily 
knowable substantive natural law to guide practical 
reason. (Aristotle, to most Straussians and to Nichols, 
seems to deny both of these things.) So long as the few 
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who are best by nature rule, guided only by their 
independent judgment and by the precepts of a natural 
law that is embedded in the unwritten customs of every 
polity, there is no reason to be much troubled by those 
laws that make Athens distinctly Athenian. 
The spin that Swanson puts on Aristotle is opposed to 
Arendtian and communitarian readings; but her own 
theoretical framework is not evident (to this reader, at 
least), though it seems to be in the direction of Oake- 
shott and possibly Voegelin, rather than Strauss. But 
this is never altogether clear, so it is difficult to ascertain 
what overall political theoretical conception supplies the 
context and motive for Swanson's unusual reading of 
Aristotle. This makes it hard to see any consistent 
narrative or discursive line to her argument as it moves 
from chapter to chapter to consider the virtues that her 
Aristotle thinks must be developed in the household 
(rather than the city), in the relation between master and 
slave, in the separate spheres of husband and wife, in 
the economic market, in friendship, and in philosophy. 
Her writing is sometimes awkward and stilted and 
conjures a very censorious and moralistic Aristotle, as 
though she were not yet fully comfortable with her texts. 
A provocative and wide-ranging study of this kind 
always risks relying too heavily on quirky readings of 
single passages taken out of context, on theory-driven 
readings of ambiguous passages, and on repeatedly 
exaggerated formulations of the point the author ur- 
gently wants us to hear. Swanson's work sometimes 
suffers from all these weaknesses, but her occasional 
stylistic infelicities do not obscure the novelty and the 
importance of what she has to say. There is something 
powerfully plausible in her assertion that Aristotle at 
least implies a conception of the private not as a pro- 
tected space for pursuing one's own good in one's own 
way but as an opportunity for cultivating virtues. Swan- 
son has read widely and well, and the book vividly calls 
attention to the various ways in which Aristotle's dis- 
cussions of character and moral education regard public 
life with a much higher degree of suspicion than any 
ardent communitarian, ancient or modern, would dis- 
play. 
Mary Nichols is a master of the difficult rhetorical art 
of exposing her arguments to challenge without aban- 
doning them, and because of this, her book speaks with 
an unusual authority that must arise from many hours 
intelligently spent reading and thinking and conversing 
about the meaning of the Politics. Citizens and Statesmen is 
a marvel of close reading combined with clarity and 
consummate accessibility. For Swanson's Aristotle, po- 
litical life is neither ennobling nor challenging. For 
Nichols's Aristotle, it is both. Her study takes, as its 
point of departure, the dispute between "democratic" 
and "aristocratic" interpreters of the Politics, both of 
whom see in Aristotle a way of challenging modern 
liberalism by bringing to the fore qualities that liberalism 
seems to lack-democratic readers stressing Aristotle's 
focus on the importance of a political community com- 
posed of equal and participatory citizens, aristocratic 
readers, Aristotle's recognition of human inequality and 
of the importance of leadership by virtuous statesmen. 
Nichols's argument is that the two readings are each 
partially true and partially distorting; each exaggerates 
one element in Aristotle's political understanding, by 
depreciating either the extent to which Aristotle ac- 
knowledges human inequality (the typical failure of the 
democratic reading) or the extent to which he is aware of 
the dangers of falsely claiming superiority or overstating 
the degree of superiority of some to others (the typical 
failure of the aristocratic reading). Nichols's position is 
that good politics for Aristotle must accommodate the 
just claims of both the democratic many and the states- 
manly few; to hold otherwise, she argues, is to court 
democratic or oligarchic despotism. Statesmen and dem- 
ocratic citizens are mutually dependent. Without some 
degree of democratic participation as a check on their 
powers, statesmen are likely to forget that they are 
humans subject to human limitations and incline to 
substitute tyranny for polity; without statesmanly lead- 
ership, citizens will fall into factional conflict and reduce 
the political community to civil war. 
Similarly, philosophy and political activity are mutu- 
ally supportive activities. Statesmanship involves learn- 
ing the complexity of the world, learning what can be 
controlled and what is beyond control. By acting as 
statesmen and only by acting as statesmen, philoso- 
phers like Aristotle are in a position to understand 
themselves and so to make a step toward understanding 
the whole. The Politics itself, Nichols argues, involves 
statesmanship of this kind. Nichols is careful not to 
dissolve all difference between philosophy and states- 
manship. (Unlike the statesman, Aristotle's chief inter- 
est, she says, is not establishing the best possible polis 
but understanding beings.) But there is no immediate 
royal road to wisdom for Nichols's Aristotle: the path to 
such understanding lies only through the city. Her 
account of the need for mediation and indirection in 
Aristotle's version of philosophic education recalls the 
Platonic Socrates' flight to the logoi (rational and ram- 
bling speeches, as opposed to algorithmic deduction or 
intuitive silence) and to self-understanding as a neces- 
sary stage of the human journey to wisdom, in spite of 
the fact that she, too, often insists on a picture of a 
rigidly aristocratic Plato to serve as a foil for her more 
flexible and democratic Aristotle. It is also the case that 
her reading needs to be tempered by readings like Judith 
Swanson's. I would add that, contra Nichols, the road 
through politics and self-understanding is not the only 
option Aristotle suggests for our indirect approach to the 
hidden truths of things. Potentiality, actuality and the 
other central elements of first philosophy can also be 
approached through the careful study of nature and the 
many natures-through what we call natural science. In 
the end, what matters most is that both Nichols and 
Swanson implicitly maintain still a third mode of indirect 
access to the things that are, the way of articulate and 
critical reflection on texts such as Aristotle's Politics. 
Bryn Mawr College STEPHEN SALKEVER 
The Quality of Life. Edited by Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 452p. $65.00 cloth, $19.95 paper. 
This plump volume records the proceedings of a 
conference held at Helsinki in 1988, under sponsorship 
of the UN's World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (WIDER). We are told on the fly sheet that 
WIDER's purpose "is to help identify and meet the need 
for policy-oriented socioeconomic research on pressing 
global and development problems, as well as common 
domestic problems and their interrelationships." It is 
not altogether easy to see how this conference and the 
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